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THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED 
REINSURANCE 
JOHN V. JACOBI* 
INTRODUCTION 
The structure of health insurance is changing due to concerns over 
inflation, uninsurance, and medical injuries.  This article will briefly discuss 
the current health insurance reform framework, focusing on one aspect of 
many insurance reform proposals: government-provided reinsurance.  Through 
reinsurance programs, government can stabilize private insurance markets, 
reduce premiums, and spread the cost of catastrophic care at a relatively 
modest price for taxpayers.  Reinsurance programs are, therefore, important 
components of current health finance reform measures and are worthy of 
discussion.  More significantly, considering the place of governmental 
reinsurance in American health finance suggests a way to break through a 
barrier that exists in health reform between those who propose 
(unrealistically?) “fundamental” reform and those who propose (merely?) 
“incremental” reforms. 
American health coverage has historically been premised on employment-
based insurance.  Employment-based insurance is eroding, however.  The 
causes are contested, but globalization and changing employment structures 
appear to be the major culprits.  The extent to which the erosion is irreversible 
is also contested, although I will argue here that employer-based coverage will 
inevitably continue to shrink absent some major structural changes.  I also 
argue that the structure of reinsurance programs is a guide to the changes that 
could respond to the erosion of the employment-based insurance system.  The 
insight driving this argument is that both government-focused reinsurance 
programs and market-focused consumer-driven health care programs share a 
vision of catastrophic care as a social, rather than an individual responsibility.  
That is, both programs see the risk of catastrophic health costs as amenable to 
broad pooling in a way that more routine health costs need not be.  
 
* Dorothea Dix Professor of Health Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law School.  Thanks to the 
participants in From Risk to Ruin: Shifting the Cost of Health Care to Consumers at Saint Louis 
University School of Law.  Thanks also to Tara Swenson (Seton Hall Law School, 2007) for her 
excellent research assistance. 
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Reinsurance programs are, then, important components of short term health 
reform and are also essential templates for redistributions of health finance 
responsibility that can usher in a new era of American health finance. 
The return of health finance reform to the forefront of the public policy 
agenda is, at least in retrospect, inevitable.  Congress and the states punted on 
the health reform movement of the early 1990s.  In the absence of solutions to 
festering health finance problems, sharply rising prices and insurance 
premiums, shrinking access to coverage, and dismay over increasing evidence 
of quality shortfalls have created a crisis atmosphere.  Part I of this article will 
briefly describe the crises in cost, quality, and coverage that propel reform 
discussion.  It will then briefly describe responsive reform proposals that have 
included calls for a lessening of governmental involvement in health finance 
and greater reliance on private contractual, market-governed arrangements and 
contrary calls for more governmental involvement in the form of single-payer, 
national health coverage.  Finally, it describes the emerging form of statutory 
reform, which forges a path between the extremes and incrementally changes 
the current health regulatory structure. 
Part II introduces health reinsurance and describes the importance of 
governmental reinsurance of health risk to emerging statutory health insurance 
reforms.  The utility of governmental health reinsurance is premised on the 
dramatically skewed nature of health spending, as the sickest 2% of the 
population accounts for almost 40% of health costs, while half the population 
uses little or no care in any year.1  Through reinsurance programs, government 
can induce private plans to participate in precarious individual and small group 
markets by agreeing to accept part of the risk of the sickest, highest cost 
members.  Government reinsurance programs can, in the short-term, stabilize 
private markets, reduce premiums, and improve access to coordinated complex 
care, all at a reasonable cost to taxpayers. 
Part III explores the longer-term implications of governmental reinsurance 
programs.  It explores the justifications for broad social responsibility for the 
higher costs of the very sick in society, and the (somewhat surprising) 
agreement among very different advocates that catastrophic costs are properly 
subject to social pooling.  It then describes the benefits of a broader application 
of government reinsurance programs.  Such programs can work a 
reconfiguration of the American public-private health insurance partnership.  
They can shift to government truly social costs for conditions often requiring 
case management over a multi-year, even lifetime perspective, while 
maintaining the familiar relationships among patients, physicians, and primary 
insurers.  These programs create a different kind of incremental change in 
 
 1. See KATHERINE SWARTZ, REINSURING HEALTH: WHY MORE MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE 
ARE UNINSURED AND WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO 61–62 (2006); John V. Jacobi, Consumer 
Driven Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 562–63 (2005). 
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health finance.  They permit metered shifts in the financial responsibilities for 
health care and create political space for consideration of further evolution of 
the governmental role in American health finance. 
I.  REFORM REDUX 
Costs are up, coverage is down, and quality is under question.  It is time 
again for health reform discussions in America.  That most agree that it is time 
to reform our health finance system does not, of course, suggest that real 
reform will come.  Repeated cycles of reform efforts in the Twentieth Century 
did not net comprehensive reform, notwithstanding good reasons for such 
reform and good contemporaneous examples from abroad.2  Another cycle is 
in process, and the public policy analysis and political positioning is in full 
swing.3  This part will briefly set out the crises motivating the latest cycle of 
reform discussions, describe the range of systemic and incremental proposals 
that have surfaced, and describe the state-based reforms that these discussions 
have generated. 
A. Stormy Health Policy Weather 
1. Access, Cost, and Quality 
Our health care system is sick, and it appears to be getting sicker.4  
National health expenditures reached almost $1.9 trillion, or 16% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP), in 2004.5  Spending is projected to increase to over 
$4 trillion, or 20% of the GDP, in 2015.6  While the rate of annual increase in 
health expenditures slowed slightly from 2000 to 2005 (from 11.5% to 9.2%), 
the rate is well above the rate of background inflation and is projected to 
continue at 7% or more through 2015. 7  In constant dollars, national health 
expenditures are expected to nearly triple from 1993 to 2015.8 
 
 2. See JILL GUADAGNO, ONE NATION UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO NATIONAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE (2005); Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Health Reform: Why do Bad 
Things Happen to Good Plans?, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 27, 2003, at W3-391, http://content.health 
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.391v1.pdf. 
 3. See MARC J. ROBERTS ET AL., GETTING HEALTH REFORM RIGHT: A GUIDE TO 
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND EQUITY 21–37 (2004) (describing the flow and components of 
the “health reform cycle”). 
 4. See Victor R. Fuchs & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform: Why? What? When?, 
24 HEALTH AFF. 1399, 1399–1400 (2005) (discussing cost, quality, and access concerns). 
 5. Christine Borger et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2015: Changes On The 
Horizon, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 22, 2006, at w61, w62, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
25/2/w61.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at w63. 
 8. Id. at w62. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
372 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:369 
The rate of health insurance coverage is deteriorating.  Between 2000 and 
2004, the number of uninsured persons in the United States increased by 6 
million, and the rate of uninsurance among the non-elderly rose from 16.1% to 
17.8%.9  The “snapshot” rate of health uninsurance tends to mask the extent of 
the problem; in the two-year period from 2002 to 2003, over 81 million 
Americans were uninsured for some period, and over 53 million were 
uninsured for at least six months.10  The connection between uninsured status 
and health status is also increasingly clear.  The old saw that lack of coverage 
is not a health factor because the uninsured get treatment regardless has lost its 
power.  People without health coverage are at an increased risk of early death 
and experience lower health status than those with insurance.11  This is 
particularly true for people with chronic illness, as continuity of care and 
routine medical monitoring take on heightened importance for this 
population.12 
Our faith in the quality of the American health care system is shaken even 
for those with health coverage.  Reports from the Institute of Medicine in 2000, 
2001, and 2006 laid bare a statistical case that adverse outcomes are 
disturbingly common in hospitals and other health care settings.13  Medication 
errors, for example, were identified as causing thousands of deaths per year14 
and add $3.5 billion to the cost of health care.15 The most recent of these 
studies further reported that medication errors cause non-fatal injuries to 1.5 
million patients per year.16  In addition, variations in treatment from region to 
region without any apparent clinical explanation diminish quality outcomes, 
calling into question the faith historically placed on physician judgment.17  
Further, quality of the care that is provided seems to vary on the basis of the 
 
 9. John Holahan & Allison Cook, Changes In Economic Conditions And Health Insurance 
Coverage, 2000–2004, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 1, 2005, at W5-498, W5-499–W5-500, 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.498v1.pdf. 
 10. FAMILIES USA, ONE IN THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH 
INSURANCE, 2002–2003 1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/ 
82million_uninsured_report6fdc.pdf. 
 11. INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 86–87 (2002) 
(stating that adults without health insurance coverage “have poorer clinical outcomes and poorer 
overall health than do adults with private health insurance”) (emphasis in original). 
 12. Id. at 57–80. 
 13. INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS (2006) [hereinafter PREVENTING 
MEDICAL ERRORS]; INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001); INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH 
SYSTEM (1999) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN]. 
 14. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 13, at 32. 
 15. Id. at 117. 
 16. PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS, supra note 13, at 112. 
 17. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 266–67 (2003) 
(citing studies). 
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race of the patient, with people of color less likely than white patients to 
receive a wide range of therapeutic interventions.18 Confidence that ours is 
“the best health care system in the world”19 is fundamentally challenged. 
Concerns about cost, quality, and access have reactivated interest in 
international comparisons.  It is well-understood that we pay more for health 
care than any other nation in the world—dramatically so if the difference is 
measured in dollars, but still substantially so if the difference is measured by 
share of GDP.20  This is true even though the industrialized countries with 
which we compare ourselves provide coverage for almost all residents, while 
about one-third of Americans under age 65 were uninsured for some period 
during 2002 to 2003.21  While we pay more, our health status lags that of more 
parsimonious OECD nations on measures such as life expectancy, “healthy life 
expectancy,” and infant mortality,22 although many factors other than health 
care influence health status.23  Americans, then, pay exorbitantly for health 
coverage that leaves a large group of citizens uncovered, and that leaves us 
sicker, and dying younger, than people in other relevantly similar countries.  It 
is no wonder that Americans are again turning to health reform; they 
increasingly believe, as Woolhandler and Himmelstein suggest, that we pay for 
universal health coverage, but we do not get it.24 
2. The Erosion of Employment-Based Health Insurance 
Most Americans obtain health insurance as a fringe benefit of employment, 
and we therefore think of our system of health coverage as anchored by private 
job-based coverage.  Employment-based coverage was recently described as “a 
cornerstone of the U.S. health care system, as vital in some ways to the health 
 
 18. See INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE  77–79 (2003); David R. Smith, Race, Health, and Health Care, 48 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 13, 29–33 (2003). 
 19. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An 
Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 552 (2006) (citing U.S. 
Department of State release regarding President George W. Bush’s comments). 
 20. See Gerald F. Anderson et al., Health Spending In the United States and the Rest of the 
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 905 (2005). 
 21. See Jost, supra note 19, at 540. 
 22. Id. at 553 (discussing OECD data); Bruce Spitz & John Abramson, When Health Policy 
Is the Problem: A Report from the Field, J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 328 (2005) (discussing 
OECD data). 
 23. See Jost, supra note 19, at 552; see also, RICHARD WILKERSON, THE IMPACT OF 
INEQUALITY: HOW TO MAKE SICK SOCIETIES HEALTHIER 105–110 (2005) (relating poor health 
status in the United States to high levels of socioeconomic inequality); David Mechanic, 
Disadvantage, Inequality, And Social Policy, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 48 (explaining 
that disparities in access to jobs, education, and income support are, along with disparities in 
access to health care, important determinants of health status). 
 24. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying For National Health Insurance—
And Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 88. 
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care of Americans as the drugs, devices, and medical services that the 
insurance covers.”25  But the employment-based system is eroding.  In the 
four-year period at the beginning of this decade, the number of non-elderly 
Americans with job-based coverage shrank by almost 5 million, as the non-
elderly population rose by 10 million.26  The number covered by public 
insurance rose during that time, as did the number of uninsured.27  The rate of 
employment-based coverage for the non-elderly declined from about 68% to 
about 60% in the five years from 2000 to 2005, evidencing a trend or erosion 
of employment-based coverage,28 and further driving health reform interest; it 
is difficult to justify standing pat with a system that is slowly disappearing.29 
Some disaggregation of the erosion phenomenon helps to inform the 
reform impulse.  One aspect is the translation of the high cost of health care to 
the cost of health coverage.  The annual cost of employment-based coverage 
has risen to over $4,000 for individual coverage and to almost $11,000 for 
family coverage.30  The increased cost of coverage is, of course, closely 
connected to inflation in the underlying costs of health care; in addition, 
however, the for-profit health insurance firms that dominate the employment-
based insurance market have consciously adopted business plans over the last 
several years that emphasize increased profit margins even at the cost of 
reducing their targets for membership.31  This business plan, which reduces 
emphasis on both increasing enrollment and reducing costs in favor of 
improving returns on investments, has been criticized by some industry 
analysts as impairing the viability of the employment-based insurance 
market.32 
 
 25. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins 
and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82 (2006). 
 26. Holahan & Cook, supra note 9, at W5-499–W5-501. 
 27. Id. at W5-501. 
 28. See KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH 
BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 34 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/ 
upload/7315.pdf [hereafter KFF/HRET 2005 SURVEY]; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 44; 
Holahan & Cook, supra note 9, at W5-501. 
 29. See Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?, 
HEALTH AFF., May 28, 2003, at W3-237, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
hlthaff.w3.237v1.pdf. 
 30. Jon Gabel et al., Health Benefits In 2005: Premium Increases Slow Down, Coverage 
Continues to Erode, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1273, 1275 (2005) (reporting on 2005 data). 
 31. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, After Streak of Strong Profits, Health Insurers May See Decline, 
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2006, at A1. 
 32. Id. (quoting analyst Robert Laszewski: “Where is this industry in four, five years if it 
can’t control health-care costs? . . . It’s on a long walk off a short pier.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED REINSURANCE 375 
But cost alone does not explain the drop-off in coverage; large firms 
continue to offer coverage nearly universally.33  Several factors combine to 
explain the erosion.  First, new jobs in today’s economy are likely to be lower-
paid service jobs in small firms, not manufacturing jobs, where unionization 
and full benefits are the norm.34  Offers of coverage in very small firms 
dropped dramatically from 2000 to 2004, from 57% to 47%.35 
Second, the rate of inflation in the cost of health insurance, while it has 
moderated a bit in recent years, is still substantially above the rate of 
background inflation.36  Health economists largely agree that the cost of 
employment-based health coverage is merely a component of compensation 
and that the effects of cost increases therefore are just translated into 
reductions in other forms of compensation.  However, premium increases that 
repeatedly outstrip inflation rates raise special problems.  As the cost of family 
health coverage has now outstripped the value of an entire year’s pay at 
minimum wage, there is increasingly nowhere for the cost to be shifted for 
employers of low- and moderate-wage workers.37  Third, many businesses are 
shifting a growing percentage of their workforce from the status of employee 
to that of independent contractor—in large part to avoid the cost of fringe 
benefits, health insurance in particular.38  Unless the American economy 
reverses course and returns to the halcyon days of high-paid lifetime 
employment in large firms, the drain on employment-based coverage threatens 
to continue.  In an age of globalization, such a reversal seems unlikely. 
These factors driving the erosion of employment-based insurance are 
accelerating the push for health reform.  To some, these factors might suggest 
that the time for reliance on the workplace as a source of coverage is past, and 
fundamental reform is now necessary.  Short of that conclusion, others may 
conclude from the rate of erosion in job-based coverage that some incremental 
reform is needed in the near future. 
B. Renewed Interest in Reform 
Renewed concern over cost, quality, and access has reinvigorated public 
policy debate.  The full breadth of the debate will be only quickly sketched out 
here.  The landscape of the reform discussion is usually described as defined 
 
 33. See KFF/HRET 2005 SURVEY, supra note 28, at 35 (reporting that 98% of firms with 
over 200 workers offer health coverage); Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1277 (same). 
 34. SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 22–23. 
 35. Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1277 (reporting on firms with three to nine employees).  
There is good reason to believe that coverage for small firms is also more expensive on a per-
employee basis than it is for large firms.  See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 51–54; see also infra Part 
II.C.  But see Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1275. 
 36. See KFF/HRET 2005 SURVEY, supra note 28, at 17. 
 37. Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1275. 
 38. SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 23–28. 
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by two poles with a vast middle ground between.  The first pole stakes out the 
view that market forces and consumerism, if set free from excessive regulation, 
could improve efficiency, lower the rates of health inflation, improve quality, 
and enhance consumer satisfaction.  Essentially associated with this pole is the 
view that genuine reform entails allowing the marketplace and free contracts to 
control health transactions.  From this perspective, government interference in 
markets is inevitably harmful, and government should therefore limit itself to 
protecting markets (through, for example, enforcement of anti-trust rules).  In 
addition, government may provide direct financial support to the poor to 
enable them to participate in a free market, but that support should go directly 
to the poor, preferably in the form of refundable tax credits, in order to avoid 
distortions to the market.39  Health insurance coverage should be stripped of 
intermediaries to allow (through health savings accounts or similar 
mechanisms) consumers to make their own choices.40  These views are 
advanced by, for example, the Heritage Foundation41 and the Cato Institute.42 
The second pole regards health care as largely a non-market good and 
regards direct government action as necessary and appropriate to achieve 
universal health coverage.  Advocates of universal governmental coverage 
question the value of markets in health financing and delivery to a greater or 
lesser extent and instead advance a system in which government (usually the 
federal government) is the “single-payer” for health services43 or the purchaser 
 
 39. One model for a very comprehensive and highly detailed description of such a tax credit 
system for the low-income uninsured is found in Lawrence Zelenak, A Health Insurance Tax 
Credit for Uninsured Workers, 38 INQUIRY 106 (2001). 
 40. See John C. Goodman, Designing Health Insurance for the Information Age, in 
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND 
POLICYMAKERS 224 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004). 
 41. The Heritage Foundation’s Health Care Reform web page opens with the following 
statement: 
The Healthcare system in the United States is in desperate need of significant reform.  
Policy makers should take decisive steps to move today’s bureaucracy driven, heavily 
regulated third-party payment system to a new patient-centered system of consumer 
choice and real free-market reform. 
Heritage Foundation, Issues: Health Care: Health Care Reform, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/healthcarereform/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 
2007). 
 42. See Michael F. Cannon et al., Combining Tax Reform and Health Care Reform With 
Large HSAs, TAX & BUDGET BULL. (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 2005, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0505-23.pdf. 
 43. See JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO 
IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT (2005); Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer 
National Health Insurance, Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National 
Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2003). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED REINSURANCE 377 
of vouchers for coverage for all.44  Others advocate universal governmental 
coverage without specifying a blueprint for such a program, although they 
often accompany such advocacy with descriptions of national health programs 
in other nations.45  These advocates share a belief in the primacy of providing 
access to health care for all, a rejection of markets as suitable mechanisms for 
health reform in favor of regulatory solutions, and a belief that universal-
coverage systems can, in addition to resolving the access crisis, also provide 
the means to address rising costs and uneven quality.  These views are 
advanced, for example, by the Commonwealth Fund,46 the Children’s Defense 
Fund,47 and Physicians for a National Health Program.48 
Between these poles is a large group of incrementalists.  Incrementalists 
approach problems of cost, quality, and access by positing that our current 
financing structure is unlikely to see dramatic change in the future and then 
proposing changes within the current framework.  Some would target 
vulnerable populations for coverage by existing public insurance programs.49  
Others would empower consumers with information and purchasing power, 
with the goal of forcing change over time in response to market pressure.50  
Others would focus on insurance law, shoring up crumbling individual and 
small group markets by changing the law on mandated benefits, pooling of 
small groups, regulating (or deregulating) state rate setting, or adding subsidies 
to moderate high prices. 
A number of reforms have been adopted in recent years at both the federal 
and state levels.  The emphasis in federal reform efforts has been on increasing 
 
 44. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers—A Proposal for 
Universal Coverage, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255 (2005). 
 45. See INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 153–54 (2004) (advocating statutory universal coverage, and recommending 
“principles” to guide the selection of a mechanism for such coverage, but not recommending any 
particular mechanism); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING 
OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 277–79 (2003) (after 
extensive discussion of other nations’ national health programs, advocating a legal entitlement to 
care under a national health coverage model). 
 46. See Karen Davis, Universal Coverage in the United States: Lesson from Experience of 
the Twentieth Century, ISSUE BRIEF (Commonwealth Fund, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2001, 
available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/davis_universal.pdf. 
 47. See Press Release, Statement by Marian Wright Edelman for “Cover the Uninsured 
Week” (May 10, 2004) (advocating “health insurance coverage for every American”), available 
at http://www.commondreams.org/news2004/0510-05.htm. 
 48. The website for Physicians for a National Health Program describes the organization as 
“a nonprofit organization of 14,000 physicians, medical students and health professionals who 
support single-payer national health insurance.”  PNHP: Physicians for a National Health 
Program, http://www.pnhp.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 49. See Richard P. Nathan, Federalism And Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458 (2005). 
 50. See Greg Scandlen, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Just a Tweak Or A Revolution?, 24 
HEALTH AFF. 1554 (2005). 
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consumer responsibility and authority for health purchasing decisions.  These 
“ownership society” reforms center on the facilitation of the creation of 
consumer-driven health plans, which combine tax-favored spending accounts 
(health savings accounts) and high-deductible health insurance.51  While 
consumer-directed health care had been discussed in policy circles for many 
years,52 I.R.S. confirmation that contributions to health savings accounts are 
entitled to favorable tax treatment provided a spur to its adoption.53  Section 
223 of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 codified the I.R.S. ruling, 
further enhancing the status of consumer-driven care.54  The consumer-driven 
plans springing up as a result of these reforms are intended to incrementally 
advance the goals of attacking health care cost-inflation by treating health care 
as a consumer good and encouraging consumers to shop for price and quality 
as they would in any other context.55  Reducing prices is a key to increasing 
access to coverage.56 
State reforms have been quite varied in recent years.  Some of the 
measures are narrowly targeted toward one group of residents.  Illinois’ All 
Kids program, for example, makes coverage available to all children in the 
state without charge (for very low-income children) or on a sliding scale 
basis.57  Arkansas, using some state funding and some federal funding, has 
created a program offering very basic coverage of services for low-income 
employees of small businesses.58  New Jersey has required insurers to make 
coverage available under a parent’s plan for their unmarried, otherwise 
 
 51. See Jacobi, supra note 1, at 549–55; Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of 
Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 791–94 (2006). 
 52. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING 
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS (1992); Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Tax Credits For 
Health Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts, 14 HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 125, 126. 
 53. See Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75; I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93; see 
also Jacobi, supra note 1, at 550; Monahan, supra note 51, at 794. 
 54. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 223, 117 Stat. 2066, 2471–72 
(2003).  See Jacobi, supra note 1, at 550; Monahan, supra note 51, at 795–96. 
 55. See Jacobi, supra note 1, at 556–57; Monahan, supra note 51, at 901–05. 
 56. The addition of pharmaceutical benefits to the Medicare program suggests that the 
current federal administration is not entirely adverse to “big government” solutions to access 
concerns.  Even there, however, pharmaceutical benefits were added to Medicare using market 
mechanisms foreign to much of traditional Medicare.  But the pharmaceutical benefit was added 
with a market twist.  While Medicare maintains insurance functions “in-house” for most other 
services for most beneficiaries, beneficiaries must access pharmaceutical coverage through 
private insurers. 
 57. See State of Illinois, About All Kids, http://www.allkidscovered.com/about.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2007); State of Illinois, All Kids Income Standards & Cost Sharing Chart, 
http://www.allkidscovered.com/income.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 58. See ARHealthNet, What is ARHealthNet?, http://www.arhealthnet.com/ (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2007). 
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uninsured children up to age 30.59  Maryland enacted a law that requires very 
large employers to either devote 8% of its total employee compensation 
payment to health care costs, or to pay the difference between its expenditures 
on employee health and the 8% floor to the state.60  Although a federal court 
found the statute preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA),61 many other states are considering similar legislation.62 
Many states have reconfigured or are considering reconfiguring their 
Medicaid programs after the Medicaid amendments contained in the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA).63  In particular, states are taking advantage of 
the DRA’s grant of flexibility to modify covered benefits and to increase 
beneficiary cost sharing.  Florida, in a program which was created before the 
passage of the DRA but has received federal approval, will limit the coverage 
available to Medicaid beneficiaries to a pre-set annual limit; with some 
exceptions, neither the state nor the plan will have any responsibility for 
coverage once that benefit limit is reached.64  West Virginia’s Medicaid 
program will create two tiers of Medicaid coverage for children and their 
parents: the “basic” plan limits prescription drug coverage and mental health 
and diabetes coverage, while the “enhanced” plan has enriched prescription 
drug benefits and mental health and diabetes care benefits.65  The enhanced 
benefits are available only to families who sign and comply with a pledge to 
engage in “responsible” health behavior.66  Kentucky’s Medicaid reform 
combines increased beneficiary cost-sharing and reduced benefits with the 
promise of increased disease management.67 
Several states have adopted more far-ranging plans, cobbling together 
several components to reduce their rates of uninsurance.  Massachusetts 
 
 59. N.J. STAT. ANN. 17B:27-30.5 (West 2006). 
 60. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-101. 
 61. Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006). 
 62. See National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006-2007 Fair Share Health Care Fund 
Or “Pay or Play” Bills: Can States Mandate Employer Health Insurance Benefits?, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/payorplay2006.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
 63. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006); see Robin Rudowitz & Andy Schneider, The 
Nuts and Bolts of Making Medicaid Policy Changes: An Overview and a Look at the Deficit 
Reduction Act, POL’Y BRIEF (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), 
Aug. 2006, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7550.pdf. 
 64. See Florida Medicaid Waiver: Key Program Changes and Issues, MEDICAID FACTS 
(Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2005, available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7443.pdf. 
 65. West Virginia Medicaid State Plan Amendment: Key Program Changes and Questions, 
MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7529.pdf. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See KyHealth Choices Medicaid Reform: Key Program Changes and Questions, 
MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006, 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7530.pdf. 
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adopted its reform act in 2006.68  Although the plan remains to be fleshed out 
in regulation, it aims to increase access by subsidizing some insurance 
coverage, expanding its Medicaid program, and using a “health insurance 
connector” to act as a purchasing tool for individuals or employees of small 
businesses.69  Most controversially, it will eventually require all individuals to 
purchase coverage and will impose a small annual cost on employers that do 
not provide coverage to their employees.70 
Vermont also adopted its health reform statute in 2006.71  It provides 
needs-based subsidies for the purchase of insurance, creates a mechanism for 
coordinating insurance purchase for individuals and employees of small 
businesses, and relies on expansion of its Medicaid program.72  In addition, it 
features extensive use of chronic care management techniques as a method of 
increasing quality and reducing costs.73  Maine’s Dirigo Health Reform Act 
was enacted in 2003.74  It provides subsidies for insurance for uninsured 
individuals and employees of small businesses, along with initiatives to contain 
cost and improve quality.75  New York’s Health Reform Act, passed in 1999, 
similarly provides some subsidy for insurance for uninsured individuals and 
employees of small businesses.76  New York’s plan, called “Healthy NY,” 
applies its subsidy differently than the other reforming states’ programs: 
instead of providing subsidy directly to reduce the price of insurance purchase, 
New York uses its subsidy to fund reinsurance for the highest-risk persons 
 
 68. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass. 
Acts ch. 58, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm. 
 69. See Edmund F. Haislmaier, The Significance of Massachusetts Health Reform, Apr. 11, 
2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/wm1035.cfm. 
 70. See David B. Kendall, Massachusetts Raises the Bar for Health Care Reform, FRONT & 
CENTER (Progressive Pol’y Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 17, 2006, available at 
http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=253823. 
 71. An Act Relating to Catamount Health, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves, Act no. 190, available 
at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/HealthCare/catamount.htm (Click link for “Act 190”); An Act 
Relating to Health Care Affordability for Vermonters, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves, Act no. 191, 
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/HealthCare/catamount.htm (Click link for “Act 191”). 
 72. See Details About the 2006 Health Care Affordability Act, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/ 
HealthCare/Q&A_Details_on_Health_Care_Affordability_Act_H_861.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 
2007). 
 73. Id. 
 74. An Act to Provide Affordable Health Insurance to Small Businesses and Individuals and 
to Control Health Care Costs, 2003 Me. Laws 1305–1339. 
 75. See JILL ROSENTHAL & CYNTHIA PERNICE, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, 
DESIGNING MAINE’S DIRIGOCHOICE BENEFIT PLAN: STRIVING TO IMPROVE HEALTH AS AN 
AFFORDABLE PRICE 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.nashp.org/Files/Dirigo_Issue_Brief_ 
on_Benefit_Design_final_hp.pdf. 
 76. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 132–33; see also infra Part II.C.2. 
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covered by Healthy NY.77  This reinsurance provision is discussed in more 
detail below.78 
The federal and state reforms that have recently been adopted span the 
ideological spectrum and, whatever the reformers’ ideological bent, are 
incremental in the sense that they build on rather than overthrow the basic 
structure of American health finance.  The balance of this article examines one 
important potential component of incremental reform: government-sponsored 
reinsurance.  It examines the significant power of reinsurance as a part of 
incremental reform and argues for its adoption by virtue of its potential 
immediate payoffs in cost and access, as well as its ability to serve as a bridge 
to future, for more comprehensive reform. 
C. Reinsurance 
At the end of the 1990s, American health care and health finance seemed 
increasingly dysfunctional.  Health inflation returned with a vengeance.  Rates 
of coverage were stable in the 1990s only because Medicaid expansions were 
able to make up for the erosion of private coverage; in the 2000s, the absolute 
number of uninsured persons was again on the rise.  For a time, public policy 
responses to these problems were quite thin, and governments seemed 
paralyzed.  More recently, public policy discussion has been robust from all 
political perspectives, and although the federal government has limited its 
response to largely symbolic support in the form of tax policy, state 
governments are beginning to consider a range of corrective steps, some 
discrete and targeted, some more expansive. 
Much ongoing work evaluates these policy proposals and governmental 
initiatives.  This article will not do so.  Rather, the pages below will consider 
one component of reform proposals and initiatives: governmental reinsurance 
of privately-financed primary insurance.  Part II provides background on 
reinsurance in general and governmental reinsurance in particular.  It also 
explains the rationale for including governmental reinsurance as a component 
of a broader reform program and the structure for such inclusion.  Part III 
considers some of the broader implications of governmental reinsurance as 
Americans continue to grapple with the rising costs of care.  In particular, it 
suggests the potential for governmental reinsurance serving as a focus for a 
reform discussion that might provide a means for reconsidering sharp divisions 
between pro-government and pro-market reformers and between advocates of 
incremental and fundamental reform. 
Three insights drive this emphasis on governmental reinsurance: one 
epidemiological, one structural, and one political.  The epidemiological insight, 
discussed in Part II.A., is that health expenditures are dramatically skewed, 
 
 77. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 132–33. 
 78. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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with most people using little health care each year, and a small number using 
the lion’s share.  Cost, quality, and access concerns in the Twenty-First 
Century have to internalize this fact; we must break free of average 
expenditures to see the real landscape dominated by the high costs of treating 
chronic conditions.  The structural insight is derived from the consumer-driven 
health care movement.  As that movement describes, what we currently think 
of as health insurance is divisible into two pieces.  The first piece covers the 
routine cost of primary care and other everyday care.  The second covers the 
high cost of extraordinary care, whether it is the expensive ongoing care of 
chronic illnesses, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, or the one-
time cost of treating serious traumatic injuries.  This division is important as 
reforms focus on moral hazard as a key to cost-containment; while moral 
hazard may be a useful concept for cost-containment in the first piece of health 
insurance, it seems to have far less relevance to the second.79  Rather, the non-
routine costs of health care are properly considered a pooled social cost.80  The 
political insight is that the structure of governmental reinsurance may have 
appeal across a broad swath of the political spectrum.  Market advocates may 
appreciate that it can leave intact the relationships among physicians, patients, 
and primary insurers for most transactions.  Public coverage advocates may 
appreciate that it permits government to take responsibility for and assure 
access and quality of care for the sickest and most vulnerable among us—those 
poorest served by an unreformed marketplace. 
II.  REINSURANCE AS A VITAL COMPONENT TO INCREMENTAL REFORM 
A. Smooth or Skewed: The Population Distribution of Health Spending 
We can expect the population distribution of the consumption of some 
important goods and services to be more or less smooth.  Although some of us 
have greater appetites than others, we can expect the consumption of food, on 
average, to vary by no more than a factor of two or so, and we can profitably 
use average consumption in thinking of food policy.  Similarly, while some 
people are homeless and others have a second vacation home, most Americans 
have only one dwelling place, and we can profitably think in terms of one 
home per person when thinking of housing policy.  Health expenditures do not 
fit that mold. 
 
 79. See John Nyman, Is “Moral Hazard” Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New 
Theory, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 194. 
 80. I do not wish to paper over significant divisions over how this social cost should be 
covered, and centrally over the role of private insurance and government.  See infra Part III.A.  
The structure of insurance coverage for the first piece of cost is also contested, but this dispute is 
not central to my argument.  See id. 
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National health expenditures are extremely skewed.  Each year, 90% of 
Americans use relatively little health care, accounting for only 30% of total 
expenditures.81  The sickest 10% in any year, then, account for about 70% of 
health care costs.82  Even more significantly, half of all Americans use little or 
no health care each year, as the 50% who use the least health care account only 
for 3% of expenditures.83  At the other end of the distribution, the sickest 2% 
of the population accounts for about 40% of costs, and the sickest 1% in any 
year accounts for more than a quarter of total costs.84  This skewed distribution 
endures over time.85 
This lopsided distribution has significance in the context of this article in 
two ways.  First, this distribution is an important factor in shaping any effort to 
reduce the rate of health care inflation, either through regulatory supply-side 
efforts or through market-based demand-side efforts.  The effect of this 
distribution on cost containment measures is discussed below in Part III.  
Second, this distribution affects the stability of insurance markets and in 
particular the markets for individual and small group insurance.  The effect of 
this distribution on insurance markets is discussed below in Part II.C. 
B. Reinsurance: Smoothing Out the Risks 
1. Private Market Reinsurance 
Insurance protects the purchaser (the insured) from the cost of an unlikely 
but catastrophic loss, such as a fire destroying his home, a disabling injury 
preventing him from earning a living, or the imposition of a tort judgment 
beyond his means to satisfy.  The protection arises from an insurance contract, 
through which the insured pays a premium to an insurer, thereby obliging the 
insured to pay a manageable amount (often each year) in return for transferring 
the risk of the realization of the cost of the catastrophic cost to the insurer.  The 
insurer is better able to bear the risk of the loss through diversification; it 
aggregates premiums from a large pool of insureds and holds the funds (less a 
“loading fee” representing administrative costs and profits)86 in reserve against 
 
 81. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration Of Health Expenditures, 
Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61 
(updating Berk & Monheit). 
 82. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61. 
 83. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61–62. 
 84. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61–62. 
 85. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61–62. 
 86. See J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, The Global Market for Reinsurance: 
Consolidation, Capacity, and Efficiency, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 2000 (Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds., 2000), at 159, 161–62. 
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the realization of one or more losses.87  Individuals and businesses purchase 
insurance to decrease uncertainty of risk of loss.88  Purchasers are risk-averse 
and are willing to pay more than the expected value of their loss to transfer the 
risk to an insurer.89  Insurers sell the service of accepting risk in return for a 
premium.  They set their premiums in reliance on actuarial methods for 
assessing risk across a pool of purchasers.90 
Actuarial methods provide some assurance to insurers that they will be 
able to set premiums at the proper level to bear the cost of realized risks while 
remaining solvent.91 Actuarial methods are not perfect, however, and 
predictions can be complicated by information asymmetries between insured 
and insurers, subjecting insurers to the risk that the accumulation of their 
insureds’ losses will subject the insurer to catastrophic losses.  Insurers 
therefore seek out firms to accept their risk in return for payment.92  Firms that 
accept such risk, that is, the firms that insure insurers, are reinsurers.93  
“Reinsurance” is the insuring of insurers.94  Reinsurers engage in second-order 
pooling by accepting risk from a number of insurers, further spreading the risk 
of loss.95  Insurers purchase this second-order coverage for several reasons.  
They purchase reinsurance to lessen the risks of fluctuating levels of claims.96  
The purchase allows them to reduce their level of reserves, permitting them to 
expand their business and use reserved funds for other purposes.97  In addition, 
insurers, ironically, are very risk-averse.  They purchase reinsurance to lessen 
the risks of catastrophic loss.98 
Health insurers (usually small insurers or those insuring small groups), like 
other insurers, purchase private reinsurance.99  They purchase reinsurance to 
 
 87. See GEORGE REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 22–23 (4th 
ed. 1992). 
 88. See ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 10 (7th ed. 
1980). 
 89. See Cummins & Weiss, supra note 86, at 159, 161–62. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See MEHR & CAMMICK, supra note 88, at 561–62. 
 92. See Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important To Be Left To Actuaries, 19 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (1986) (explaining uncertainties rife in actuarial practice). 
 93. Cummins & Weiss, supra note 86, at 162. 
 94. See MEHR & CAMMICK, supra note 88, at 600. 
 95. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 102–03. 
 96. See REJDA, supra note 87, at 611. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id.; Cummins & Weiss, supra note 86, at 162. 
 99. “Reinsurance” is also purchased by self-funded employer plans.  SWARTZ, supra note 1, 
at 102–03.  In such plans, an employer offers health coverage to employees, employing an 
administrator expert in claims handling, but retaining the risk of loss itself rather than contracting 
with an insurer to do so.  See id. at 103.  Self-funding is motivated in part to avoid state laws 
mandating the benefits that must be provided by insurance products.  See id.  The excess coverage 
purchased by such employers is “reinsurance” in the sense that the coverage runs to the plan, and 
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smooth out claims experience, to free up reserves, and to protect against 
catastrophic losses.100  Health insurers can purchase reinsurance in several 
different forms.  The most common are aggregate stop-loss and excess-of-loss 
coverage.  Under aggregate stop-loss coverage, the reinsurer begins paying 
when the losses of an entire group or book of business exceeds a contractual 
threshold, protecting the primary insurer from the risk that group-wide costs 
will unexpectedly exceed the actuarial expectations underlying the premium 
charged.101 Health reinsurance is also purchased on an excess-of-loss basis, by 
which the reinsurer begins paying when one member of a group’s costs exceed 
a contractual threshold; the reinsurer’s obligations under this method are 
determined on a member-by-member basis.102  Commercial reinsurance for 
health insurers, then, permits primary insurers—particularly those in the 
relatively riskier business of insuring small groups and individuals—to lay off 
some of their risk, at a price that roughly reflects the expected experience of 
the reinsured business, to add predictability to their loss experience. 
2. Government and Reinsurance: The ‘80s and ‘90s 
The previous subpart describes the business case for insurers to reinsure in 
order to stabilize their business outlooks.  But government has also had a long 
interest in the stability and health of insurers of marginal groups.  Incremental 
reforms in the last three decades have attempted to expand access to health 
coverage through Medicaid expansions.103  Reforms have attempted to balance 
this public program response with efforts to stabilize the private voluntary 
health insurance market.  As is discussed above, the problem is not with large 
employers, who cover nearly all their employees, but rather with small 
employers and self-employed persons who seek coverage in the small group 
and individual markets.  The small group and individual markets tend to be 
more expensive than large group markets,104 in part due to economies of scale, 
and in part because insurers expend more time and resources attempting to 
screen for high risks.105  While insurers have a high degree of confidence that 
 
not to the member, and attaches only when the plan’s or a member’s experience exceeds a 
contractually-set threshold.  See id.  It is not, however, reinsurance in the literal sense, as the 
coverage runs to a self-funded employer plan and not to an insurance plan.  See id. 
 100. See id. at 103; Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Financing for Health Coverage: What 
Can Reinsurance Accomplish?, 29 INQUIRY 158, 159–161 (1992). 
 101. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 104–05; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 161. 
 102. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 105; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 161. 
 103. See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
7, 11 (2001); see also Richard P. Nathan, Federalism and Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458, 
1465 (2005) (describing a federal-state dynamic by which Medicaid has expanded to cover 
additional populations and services). 
 104. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 51; Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the 
Backstop in Health Insurance Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 96 (2001). 
 105. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 52–54. 
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the employees of a large employer form a reasonably representative risk pool, 
they are skeptical of smaller groups and individuals, fearing that out-of-the-
ordinary risk can render the small group’s or individual’s premium to be 
significantly below the costs of covered care.106  Incremental reform efforts 
aimed at shoring up both the individual and small group markets have used 
reinsurance in several ways. 
Most states have high-risk pools for individuals who, due to medical 
underwriting in the state’s individual insurance market, are otherwise 
uninsurable,107 or who are insurable only at an extremely high price.108  The 
coverage usually comes with significant cost-sharing, a period of exclusion 
from coverage for pre-existing conditions, can be accompanied by low annual 
or lifetime limits on benefits,109 and can have thinner benefits than normal 
individual insurance policies.110  The reinsurance aspect of high-risk pools 
arises because the pools cannot be sustained by participants’ premiums, even 
though those premiums are substantially higher than average non-group 
premiums.111  The shortfall is usually made up through assessments on 
insurers, although some states provide limited funding from other sources.112  
The pools covers only about 8% of the target high-risk uninsurable 
population—approximately 178,000 people in 2003113—due to high premiums 
and caps on enrollment due to shortfalls in funding to supplement premium 
income.114  A small amount of federal funding has recently been appropriated 
to address these shortcomings, thus far with little effect.115 
During the 1990s, almost all states reacted to weakness in the individual 
and small group insurance markets by adopting insurance reform laws 
designed to improve access to private plans, particularly for the sick, who both 
 
 106. See id. at 53–54. 
 107. See Karen Pollitz & Eliza Bangit, Federal Aid to State High-Risk Pools: Promoting 
Health Insurance Coverage or Providing Fiscal Relief?, ISSUE BRIEF (Commonwealth Fund., 
New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Pollitz_ 
highriskpools_875.pdf.  States that do not permit medical underwriting in their small group 
markets do not have—do not need—high-risk pools. 
 108. See LORI ACHMAN & DEBORAH CHOLLET, COMMONWEALTH FUND, INSURING THE 
UNINSURABLE: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE HIGH-RISK HEALTH INSURANCE POOLS 2 (Aug. 2001), 
available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/achman_uninsurable_472.pdf. 
 109. See id. at 5–8; Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2. 
 110. See Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2. 
 111. See ACHMAN & CHOLLET, supra note 108, at 9–11; Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 
2. 
 112. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 91–92; ACHMAN & CHOLLET, supra note 108, at 9–11. 
 113. See Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2.  Another study counted only 116,000 
enrollees in high-risk pools in 2000.  Austin B. Frakt et al., High-Risk Pools for Uninsurable 
Individuals: Recent Growth, Future Prospects, 26 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV.  73, 76 (2004). 
 114. Frakt et al., supra note 113, at 76–77; Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2. 
 115. Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 9–10. 
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need insurance coverage the most and are the most unattractive customers for 
health insurers.116  These reforms attempted to decrease uninsurance by 
requiring insurers to issue policies to all regardless of health status and limit 
the duration of pre-existing illness provisions.117  In addition, many of these 
reforms constrained premium rate setting by compressing the range of prices 
that may be charged to members or even by requiring “community rating,” or 
the charging of all insureds in the same insurance pool the same premium.118  
These regulations impinge on insurers’ self-protective mechanisms, restricting 
their ability to use underwriting methods to counter information asymmetries, 
and to use premium differentiation on the basis of expected risk as a means of 
avoiding disproportionately high-risk members.119  These reforms of state 
insurance law were calculated to serve states’ insurance expansion goals.120  
To accomplish these goals, states had to keep the insurers in the game. 
The way states chose to keep insurers in the game, having limited their 
preferred means to select risk, was to build reinsurance into the reform plan.121  
The reinsurance plans, both proposed and adopted, varied in structure.  In 
some, insurers could cede the entire risk for any individual or group upon 
payment of a reinsurance premium.  Under this model, the primary insurer paid 
the reinsurer a premium (set at some multiple of the primary insurer’s 
premium), and the reinsurer accepted the full risk for that ceded individual or 
group.122  The arrangement permitted a primary insurer to shed high-risk 
individuals prospectively.123  Other models examined the aggregate experience 
of the insurers in the regulated market, determining which of the insurers did 
well and which did poorly, presumably reflecting the health status of their 
insureds.  Funds from the “winning” insurers then transferred to the “losing” 
insurers.124  Under this model, the reinsurance would partially compensate 
insurers for accepting a riskier book of business they experienced as a result of 
the state’s market reforms.  The goal of coverage for the riskiest applicants was 
to be served by depriving insurers of the tools to screen them out, and the 
reinsurance mechanism assured that participating insurers would share 
equitably the cost of the high-risk insureds.125 
 
 116. See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 73, 111–13 (2005); Colleen M. Grogan, Hope in Federalism? What Can the States 
Do and What Are They Likely to Do?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 477, 481 (1985); John V. 
Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 369–75 (1997). 
 117. See Jacobi, supra note 116, at 372–73. 
 118. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 165–66; Jacobi, supra note 116, at 373–74. 
 119. See Swartz, supra note 104, at 96–97. 
 120. See infra Part II.C. 
 121. See Jacobi, supra note 116, at 375. 
 122. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166–67. 
 123. Id. at 166. 
 124. See Jacobi, supra note 116, at 375. 
 125. Id. 
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The reinsurance efforts of the 1980s and 1990s attempted to shore up 
individual and small group markets, reflecting the belief that attempts to 
increase access by private insurance required attention to the risk selection 
methods to which insurers in these markets were naturally drawn.  These 
efforts attempted to improve access for applicants who were or were perceived 
to be high-risk by reducing uncertainty and lessening the risk exposure 
resulting from lessening the intensity of risk selection.  Because, however, 
most of these reinsurance efforts added little or no new public money, but only 
moved around the money already in the insurance system, they did not reduce 
overall premiums, but rather shifted the burden from the higher risk to the 
lower risk members.126  To the extent reformers wanted to do more than 
expand use of reinsurance for the risk-planning benefits available in private 
reinsurance markets, and instead to increase access to coverage for the 
uninsured, the vision needed to be expanded. 
C. Reinsurance in New Incremental Reform Planning 
After a hiatus, cost, quality, and access concerns have spurred new interest 
in health reform.  Reform proposals run the gamut, although it is fair to say 
that those reforms actually adopted by federal or state governments are 
incremental in character and build on existing structures including private 
insurance markets.  It is the individual and small group components of the 
insurance market that are critical to the success of incremental reform, as it is 
these sub-markets that must serve the working uninsured if private insurance is 
to continue to be the anchor of American health finance.  Those advocating 
access, cost, and quality-enhancing reform initiatives often tinker with small 
group and individual insurers’ underwriting, pricing, and design practices 
directed at avoiding high-risk enrollees.127  These practices conflict with the 
goals of reform efforts because they run counter to the goal of bringing those 
most in need of coverage into the insurance pool.128  Incremental reform often 
addresses these practices directly.  Reinsurance’s function in this reform 
environment is to address the adverse selection concerns that arise by the very 
nature of the markets and are exacerbated by restrictions on underwriting, 
pricing, and design practices.129 
A number of thoughtful analyses have examined the lessons of the past and 
the potential for the future of reinsurance in health reform.  Theses analyses 
agree that reinsurance targeted at the individual and small group markets has a 
positive but bounded role to play in incrementally improving the health 
 
 126. See Mark Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 71 (2000). 
 127. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 78–81; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 164–66. 
 128. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 78–81; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 164–66. 
 129. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166. 
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insurance system,130 and often suggest that reinsurance should be coupled with 
other regulatory changes to increase access and moderate the cost of health 
coverage.131  Reinsurance programs can assist in incremental reform efforts by 
shoring up small group and individual markets, reducing insurers risk selection 
efforts to exclude potential high-risk members, and marginally reducing the 
cost of some coverage. 
1. Shoring Up Small Group and Individual Markets 
Two factors explain the importance of small group and individual 
insurance markets in incremental health reform.  First, these markets tend 
strongly toward increased selectivity, pinching down on an important source of 
access to coverage.  Beginning in the 1980s, more aggressive underwriting 
practices in these markets caused dislocations, as individuals and members of 
small groups increasingly found themselves rated out of coverage.132  These 
practices were not irrational, as “financial risks associated with adverse 
selection are greatest for small groups and for individuals—markets where the 
variances of costs are the largest.”133  The rationality of risk selection has only 
increased, as the health care costs have risen and as it becomes increasingly 
clear that a high percentage of health costs come not from random acute 
illnesses, but from expensive chronic illnesses, many of which could be 
identified through underwriting practices.  These markets, then, are 
increasingly closed to those persons reformers most want covered. 
Second, these markets are the only sources of private coverage for most of 
the uninsured.  As is described above, large employers already cover nearly all 
of their employees.  Many of the uninsured are employees of small businesses 
or dependents of such employees.  In addition, a shift in the American 
economy in recent decades from large manufacturing enterprises to smaller 
service-sector workplaces has increased the focus on small group insurance.134  
Improving the ability of small employers to provide coverage for their 
employees is therefore a significant strategy of incremental reformers. 
 
 130. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 130–31 (arguing that government-sponsored reinsurance is 
only one component of a broader reform agenda); Deborah Chollet, The Role of Reinsurance in 
State Efforts to Expand Coverage, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES: ISSUE BRIEF (Acad. Health, 
Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2004, at 5, available at http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief 
1004.pdf; David E.M. Sappington et al., The Effects of Reinsurance in Financing Children’s 
Health Care, 43 INQUIRY 23, 29 (2006) (explaining that reinsurance may reduce variations in 
experience among insurers of SCHIP insurers, but cannot by themselves eliminate effects of 
unfavorable selection). 
 131. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 130–31; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166. 
 132. See Chollet, supra note 130, at 1. 
 133. Linda J. Blumberg & John Holohan, Government as Reinsurer: Potential Impacts on 
Public and Private Spending, 41 INQUIRY 130, 131 (2004). 
 134. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 19–23. 
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Individual insurance has been important for similar reasons, as self-
employed persons, like employees of small businesses, find themselves subject 
to increasingly difficult conditions for obtaining coverage.135  Katherine 
Swartz argues persuasively in addition that the individual market’s importance 
in health reform is increasing due to changes in the American labor market.136  
Swartz describes the growing phenomenon by which employers adjust their 
relationships with workers to transform them from “employees” to 
“independent contractors.”137  Rather than hire (or retain) employees, firms 
increasingly contract with contingent or “temporary” workers to do the work 
formerly done by employees.  The firms benefit by shedding responsibility for 
paying some payroll taxes and in addition avoid the need to pay fringe benefits 
such as pension, disability insurance, and health insurance they provide to their 
employees.138  Many workers experience this shift “in place;” they may be laid 
off as employees and then retained as contract workers on an independent 
contractor basis to do the same tasks.139  Without access to employment-based 
coverage, they must obtain coverage, if at all, through the individual market. 
Incremental reform, then, depends to some degree on the vitality of small 
group and individual insurance plans being widely available.  The dynamics 
that have weakened the small group and individual markets flow from the 
increased selectivity of insurers using increasingly aggressive risk screening 
criteria for coverage.  Reinsurance programs attempt to counter the effects of 
this trend by reducing the need for insurers to engage in aggressive risk 
selection activities, allowing insurers in small group and individual markets to 
accept a wider range of risks, and increasing access for those most in need of 
coverage.  In addition, reinsurance can support the small group and individual 
insurance markets by reducing the cost of coverage through encouraging plans 
to reduce resources devoted to risk selection, reducing the risk premium 
experienced by insurers when the risk market is volatile, and providing direct 
subsidy for small group and individual coverage.  These two functions are 
discussed in the following subpart. 
2. Increasing Access in Small Group and Individual Markets 
Insurers prefer good risks over bad for obvious business reasons.  
Reinsurance funded by insurers themselves in both voluntary markets and in 
markets created through small group and individual market reforms did little to 
change this preference.  While such reinsurance reduces the risk of insurers 
experiencing catastrophic losses, insurers must, in most cases, pay a risk-
 
 135. See Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 133, at 131. 
 136. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 23–25. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Id. at 23. 
 139. Id. 
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related premium to reinsurers.140  The existence of a market for excess risk 
does not itself reduce the incentives to risk-select so long as reinsurance 
premiums are risk-sensitive.  As Randall Bovbjerg has noted, “Reinsurance 
alone does not make carriers eager to accept high risks, for the high premium 
they must pay to the reinsurer along with ceding the high risk assures that they 
will lose money on each [high-risk] case.”141  While these reinsurance 
measures helped the business case for insurers remaining in the small group 
and individual markets, they had little effect on the plans’ preference for low-
risk insureds and their natural tendency to exploit any possibility to prefer 
good risks within theirs states’ regulatory structures.  Recent innovations in 
state reinsurance add an important additional component: substantial state 
financing of reinsurance.  Healthy NY is the most developed and studied 
example of a state’s subsidization of reinsurance in the small group and 
individual markets. 
Healthy NY is a program initiated by New York State in 2001 to shore up 
the small group and individual insurance markets to improve access to 
coverage for the uninsured.142  It was intended to reform New York’s small 
group and individual insurance markets in order to “promote access to quality 
health care through increased availability of insurance coverage.”143  It is 
designed to supplement and not supplant existing sources of coverage.  To 
avoid “crowd out” of existing coverage, it permits the enrollment of only those 
who would otherwise be uninsured by disqualifying small employers and 
individuals who have been covered by insurance within the previous 12 
months.144  The program modified individual and small group markets by 
 
 140. Private market reinsurers have the same incentive as primary insurers to charge risk-
related premiums.  See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 105–08.  Most of the reinsurance components of 
the small group and individual reform proposals in the late 1980s and early 1990s similarly 
contemplated insurers’ purchase of reinsurance.  See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166–68. 
 141. See Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 133, at 132; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 169.  
This is not to say that reinsurance programs have no effect on insurers’ approach to high-risk 
enrollees.  As Bovbjerg points out, the structured reinsurance components of the first wave of 
small group and individual insurance reforms makes compliance with restrictions on risk 
selection “more tolerable and less likely to be evaded.”  Id. 
 142. The legislation requiring reports of the program refer to it as the “healthy New York” 
program.  See N.Y. INS. LAW § 212 (McKinney 2006).  The New York Department of Insurance 
and the annual reports produced pursuant to § 212 refer to it as “Healthy NY.”  See EP&P 
CONSULTING, INC., REPORT ON HEALTHY NY PROGRAM 2005 (Dec. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/website2/hny/reports/hny2005.pdf; N.Y. Dep’t of Ins., Healthy NY: 
Reports, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/website2/hny/english/hnyrep.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).  
I adopt the latter designation here. 
 143. 1999 N.Y. Laws 1, 2 (codified as note following N.Y. INS. LAW § 4326 (McKinney 
2006)). 
 144. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 4326(c)(1)(A)(i) (McKinney 2006) (providing that sole proprietors 
with coverage in the previous twelve months are disqualified); § 4326(c)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that 
small employers with coverage in the previous twelve months are disqualified); § 
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permitting a reduction in mandated benefits, tightly-controlled networks, and 
higher cost-sharing.145  But the “most important” feature of Healthy NY is its 
state-financed stop-loss reinsurance provision.146 
Healthy NY’s reinsurance is excess-of-loss coverage, by which the 
primary insurer and New York share the risk that covered individuals will 
experience a high loss.  As initially designed, the primary insurer was 
responsible the first $30,000 of costs for each insured, with New York picking 
up responsibility for 90% of the costs for expenses between $30,000 and 
$100,000 for each individual; the primary insurer was responsible for the 
remaining 10% and all costs exceeding $100,000.147  In July 2003, the range of 
expenses subject to reinsurance changed; New York now pays 90% of all costs 
between $5,000 and $75,000 for each covered individual.148  This form of 
reinsurance is the subject of discussion in other states as a component of 
reforms directed toward increasing access to coverage and reducing 
uninsurance.149 
Healthy NY appears to have been quite successful at meeting its goals of 
expanding access to coverage.  It has enrolled over 200,000 people since it 
initiated enrollment; its active enrollment of over 106,000 people as of 
December 2005 represented a 40% increase over the course of one year.150  
The anti-crowd-out measures suggest that this enrollment represents net 
increases in coverage, and therefore, a reduction in uninsurance for the 
population of New York.  This surmise is supported by coverage trends.  The 
uninsured rate in the United States rose slightly from 1996 to 2004 (from 
15.6% to 15.7%) and dropped substantially in New York during the same 
 
4326(c)(3)(A)(i) (providing that an applicant who is an employed individual is disqualified if 
covered by insurance over previous twelve months); see also LEWIN GROUP, REPORT ON 
HEALTHY NY PROGRAM 2003 3 (Dec. 31, 2003), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ 
website2/hny/reports/hnylewin.pdf. 
 145. § 4326(d) (listing covered services); § 4326(e) (listing copayments and deductibles); see 
KATHERINE SWARTZ, COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTHY NEW YORK: MAKING INSURANCE 
MORE AFFORDABLE FOR LOW-INCOME WORKERS 9 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.ins. 
state.ny.us/website2/hny/reports/hnystudy.pdf. 
 146. SWARTZ, supra note 145, at vii.  The funding for the reinsurance in Healthy NY comes 
from New York’s tobacco settlement proceeds.  Id. at 10, n.14.  The reinsurance aspects of 
Healthy NY are described at N.Y. INS. LAW § 4327. 
 147. See § 4327(b); see also LEWIN GROUP, supra note 144, at 3–4. 
 148. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 133; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 144, at 3–4. 
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Reform?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2093, 2094 (2006) (discussing Massachusetts’ health reforms; 
suggesting that “refinements” might include adding reinsurance for high-cost cases); Katherine 
Swartz, Comments at Conference: Strategies to Strengthen Private Health Insurance Markets—
An Expert Panel Dialogue on Reinsurance, The Role of Reinsurance in Reducing the Number of 
Uninsured (June 14, 2006) (describing early version of Massachusetts’ reform legislation as 
including reinsurance component). 
 150. EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at II-1; SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 133. 
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period from 17% to 14.2%,151 and New York was one of only three states to 
show a statistically significant reduction in the two-year average rate of 
uninsurance between 2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 2005.152  Tellingly, the largest 
rate of decrease in uninsurance in New York between 2001 and 2003 was in 
households in the income range served by Healthy NY (those below 200% of 
the poverty level), while households in this income range experienced 
increasing rates of uninsurance during the same period elsewhere.153 
3. Reducing the Cost of Small Group and Individual Coverage 
Reducing a purchaser’s cost of coverage is an essential part of any strategy 
for increasing rates of insurance coverage in any system in which coverage is 
voluntary.  State-funded reinsurance can reduce the purchaser’s cost of 
coverage in two ways.  Most obviously, it is a form of subsidy because the 
state contributes a part of the cost of coverage.  Second, by reducing insurers’ 
exposure to the effects of covering high-cost members, it can lessen the 
expense of insurers’ risk selection activities and reduce the “risk premium” 
attached to underwriting decisions. 
It is widely agreed that the principle barrier to coverage expansion goals is 
the cost of coverage, particularly for individuals and employees of small firms, 
and particularly for those with low- and moderate-incomes.  A state-funded 
reinsurance program serves as a frank subsidy.  Money flowing in from 
government to subsidize the cost of coverage directly reduces price, whether 
the subsidy comes in the form of a per person voucher discounting the market 
premium, a grant directly to insurers to defray part of the cost of doing 
business, or a fund providing reinsurance for high-cost members.  New York, 
for example, allotted between $49 million and $110 million per year to state-
funded reinsurance,154 and its actual expenditures for 2004 (the first full year of 
experience under the current reinsurance attachment points)155 was 
approximately $38 million.156  The state’s expenditure of $38 million on the 
Healthy NY program amounted to approximately $500 in subsidy per covered 
life during 2004.157  The application of a $500 subsidy directly to the purchase 
of insurance would surely have some effect on increasing coverage. 
 
 151. Id. at II-18. 
 152. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 25–26 (2006), available at 
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 153. EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at II-19. 
 154. Id. at I-4. 
 155. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 144, at 3-4. 
 156. EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at I-4. 
 157. This estimate results from dividing the amount expended by New York for reinsurance 
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But state-funded reinsurance adds value beyond mere subsidy.  The 
application of subsidy as reinsurance rather than straight premium reduction 
does double duty because, in addition to slicing off a portion of premium cost, 
it can reduce the incentive for insurers to engage in administrative risk-
selection actions.  If the cost exposure from high-risk members is reduced, 
insurers will have less incentive to compete on the basis of avoiding those 
members158 and will therefore reduce their spending on efforts to screen for 
high-risk indications.159  As Professor Swartz has described this phenomenon: 
A reinsurance program reduces the risk of extremely high-cost people in the 
small-group and individual markets to a level comparable for large groups.  At 
that point, the benefits from using the mechanisms will be less than the costs, 
and insurers will reduce their use.160 
The point at which reinsurance would have this salutary effect is uncertain; it 
seems reasonable to assume, however, that reinsurance programs’ assurance of 
coverage for the extraordinary costs of covering high-risk members will affect 
the extent to which insurers will expend resources to avoid those members. 
Closely associated with the savings realized from reduced risk-selection 
activities is the somewhat more speculative savings that could be realized from 
a reduction in the risk premium as a result of the stabilizing effect of 
government-funded reinsurance.  Insurers charge more for coverage attended 
by higher degrees of uncertainty.  If an insurer rates two groups as likely to 
experience $2,000 per person in costs, but the insurer’s confidence of that 
prediction is lower for the smaller group (because a small number of outliers 
could more readily affect the average loss), it will charge a higher premium—
adding a “risk premium”—to compensate for the additional exposure, even 
though it has confidence in its actuarial analysis pegging the expected cost of 
both groups as equal.161  The application of government-funded reinsurance 
reduces the magnitude of this uncertainty and could lead to reductions in 
premium. 
Incremental reform seeks to retain much of the structure of our current 
health finance system while improving cost and access through targeted 
reforms.  As a component of incremental reform, government-funded 
reinsurance can perform three closely-related functions.  It can help to stabilize 
the individual and small group markets for health insurance—an important 
goal, as most uninsured persons can find coverage in the private market, if at 
all, only with insurers offering individual or small group policies.  It can 
 
December 2004 (76,297).  See EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at I-4, II-2. 76,297/$38 
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 158. See ACHMAN & CHOLLET, supra note 108, at 1; Sappington et al., supra note 130, at 28. 
 159. See Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 133, at 132. 
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reduce uninsurance by reducing the incentive of insurers to reject high-risk 
applicants—those persons who most need coverage.  And it can reduce the cost 
of coverage both through subsidy and through reducing insurers’ incentives to 
expend resources in risk-selection activities.  The interest in government 
reinsurance as a component of incremental reforms is therefore sensible, as it 
can apply needed subsidy that can cost-effectively shore up teetering 
individual and small group markets, expand access to coverage, and reduce the 
cost of coverage.  The next Part addresses the longer-term benefits of 
reinsurance programs. 
III.  GOVERNMENT REINSURANCE AS A BRIDGE TO SYSTEMIC REFORM 
Health reforms that dramatically change our health finance system are 
unlikely in the near future, not because there is dispute that such reform is 
needed, but because there is no political or policy consensus on the shape of 
broad reforms.162  As a result, near-term reform efforts will be limited to 
incremental reform, such as those described above in Part II.  In the process of 
shaping those incremental reforms, however, there is room for compromise 
across ideological divides to achieve progress toward universal coverage and 
other goals.163  But which incremental steps to increase access will gain 
traction? 
Compromise here can be tricky.164  It is tricky because all incremental 
reform is motivated by a larger vision of the ideal health finance system.  To 
put it another way, all incremental reforms are motivated by and directed 
toward a long-term strategy of reaching a more radically reformed system 
structured according to particular political and ideological beliefs.  Incremental 
choices may well shape broader future changes, as Alan Weil has noted: 
Increments can achieve short-term objectives, but depending upon how they 
are structured, they may make the longer-term goal of universal coverage 
easier or harder to attain.  Even though comprehensive reform seems 
unrealistic today, we must continue to discuss and define what the health care 
 
 162. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Unchanging New Leadership, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 509, 515 (2003) (arguing that only the federal government can lead true health finance 
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Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?: National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J. L. MED. 
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 163. See Mark V. Pauly, Conflict and Compromise Over Tradeoffs in Universal Health 
Insurance Plans, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 465 (2004) (suggesting means to bring together 
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get better.”  See id. at 473. 
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system of the future should look like.  Then we can judge incremental reform 
proposals not only on the basis of who they cover today, but whether they 
move us in the right direction for the future.165 
Incremental reforms likely to gain traction are those not inconsistent with the 
core  programs of either market advocates or regulatory advocates. 
Reinsurance is a component of incremental reform that is a plausible 
ground for compromise between market-oriented advocates and those 
committed to a regulatory program.  As the discussion below describes, 
reinsurance advances goals of access, quality, and cost-containment.  
Significantly, however, it does so without forcing a choice between the broad 
philosophical views of either camp.  I do not argue that reinsurance programs 
are in themselves the basis for long-term reform or even that they will be 
central components of a future, better system.  Rather, I argue that they are 
positive in themselves and are a module of reform that can fit into or be 
adapted to many different versions of long-term systemic change, allowing 
significant incremental improvements in the health finance system while the 
larger debate continues.  There are three important characteristics of 
governmental reinsurance programs that permit them to fit, Zelig-like, into 
various systems.  First, reinsurance programs pool risk at an optimal level, 
where personal security can be assured for care not reasonably amenable to 
individual consumer direction.  Second, they are flexible in both funding and 
program design.  They can be geared up gradually, employed to shore up 
different sub-markets of insurance, and modified to enhance management of 
high-cost, long-term care.  Third, they can address cost, quality, and access for 
that population segment driving the crisis: high-risk, high-cost persons with 
complex chronic conditions.  Without attention to this group, any program of 
health reform will fail. 
A. Pooling at an Optimal Level of Care 
This argument for government funding of catastrophic care comes in two 
steps, one easy and one harder.  The first step concerns the recognition that 
advocates across the spectrum of insurance reform accept that the pooling of 
resources for the provision of catastrophic care is appropriate.  Advocates of 
consumer-driven care argue that cost and quality improvements will be 
generated by empowering consumers.166  Giving (or returning to) consumers 
responsibility and authority for health care decisions will unleash market 
power, incentivizing them to compare cost and quality before purchasing and 
allowing the sum of these purchasing decisions to encourage cost and quality 
based competition.167  The mechanism for this transfer of responsibility and 
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authority, of course, is individual spending accounts, or health savings 
accounts, owned and controlled by consumers from which they will draw 
funds for their health care purchases.168  From this perspective, advancing cost 
and quality goals calls for less mediation of all sorts between consumers and 
the market.169 
Some question whether giving individual consumers market power is 
likely to achieve the ends described by advocates of consumer-driven care.170  
But the extent of the disagreement should not be overstated.  Advocates of 
using spending accounts to unleash market discipline recommend the use of 
the accounts for routine, relatively low-cost services, not for catastrophic care.  
For coverage of catastrophic care, financing in the form of traditional 
insurance is called for.171  With respect to catastrophic costs, then, advocates of 
markets and government agree: broad pooling of costs is appropriate.  This 
agreement is significant in light of the concentration of health costs in the care 
of chronically ill persons.172 
The second step in this portion of the argument is harder: should the 
pooling of funds for the payment of catastrophic costs take place in the private 
insurance market or through governmental funding?  For market advocates, the 
need to pool resources entails the need for private insurance to be responsive to 
consumer demands and spread the risk of catastrophic costs over the 
purchasers of coverage.  For advocates of government intervention, the need to 
pool resources is closely connected with the argument that coverage of the 
costs of at least some forms of health care is a public good and is therefore 
appropriately insured by government.173  The ground for agreement is the need 
for pooled and not individually controlled funding for the coverage of 
catastrophic risks. 
It may be that agreement would founder on the provision of reinsurance by 
government and not a private firm.  Well-understood failures of the insurance 
market may, however, overcome this objection.  First, reinsurance attaches 
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only when a person’s medical costs have crossed a high threshold, and 
therefore, addresses only the level of risk agreed to be suitable for social 
pooling.174  Second, it applies a government subsidy to an area in which private 
insurance fails to serve at least some of its social tasks.  Private reinsurance 
does not reduce anti-selection activities of health insurers in small group and 
individual markets, as primary insurers are required to pay risk-related 
premiums to reinsurers.175  Public reinsurance both spreads risk and subsidizes, 
as the payment for truly catastrophic costs comes not from the insurance pool, 
but from government.  Market advocates commonly accept some governmental 
financing role for those unable to pay for coverage.176  Here, government 
would finance the catastrophic care for people unable to pay for such care.  
Governmental pooling would, in addition, resolve some of the failures in the 
private reinsurance market for small group coverage.  Governmental 
assumption of this financial risk would hold stable the sub-catastrophic 
components of the health insurance system, permitting breathing room for 
further debate and experimentation from a variety of principled perspectives. 
B. Short-Term and Long-Term Flexibility 
Advocates of a governmental resolution of the health finance crisis of 
course support governmental funding of coverage, either through a 
governmental single-payer system177 or through governmental purchase of 
private coverage.178  As was suggested in the previous subpart, market 
advocates do not categorically oppose government subsidies.  Instead, they 
recognize that some government subsidies are necessary to provide coverage 
for those unable to meet market prices for insurance,179 so long as the form of 
the subsidies does not interfere with consumers’ incentives to exercise careful 
judgment as to cost and quality in health care.180 
The common ground supporting government-funded reinsurance as a 
component of incremental reform could arise from the fact that it does not 
interfere with consumers’ relationships either with health care providers or 
primary insurers.  Government-funded reinsurance can add subsidy to any sort 
of primary insurance, from first-dollar traditional insurance to consumer-driven 
plans with spending accounts.  In addition, the amount of subsidy can be 
adjusted from year to year.  This flexibility is important because it will allow a 
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reinsurance program’s funding to be increased or decreased in response to 
accumulated experience regarding the level of reinsurance necessary to serve 
access goals.  In addition, this flexibility has political appeal, as the programs 
can be reduced or increased in response to budgetary conditions without 
seriously disrupting underlying insurance relationships. 
The flexibility of this component of health reform has long-term benefits.  
Because reinsurance programs can grow and adapt alongside a wide range of 
system modifications, investment of intellectual and financial capital in the 
development of reinsurance systems is likely to pay dividends.  If the past is 
any guide, the American health finance system two decades hence will look 
structurally similar to the American health care system two decades or even 
four decades ago: a mixture of private and public insurance and a mixture of 
public and private institutions of care.  Although we are witnessing the steady 
erosion of employment-based health coverage,181 it is too soon to sound the 
death knell for that form of coverage.  There is, however, a need for some 
substantial reimagining of the relationship between the public and private 
health financing sectors.  Publicly funded resinsurance embodies one 
mechanism for the interaction of public and private spheres of influence and 
responsibility and may form the basis for enduring structures of public-private 
partnership. 
C. Emphasis on High-Risk Persons 
As described above, yearly health expenditures are extremely skewed.  The 
sickest 2% of any insurance pool accounts for 40% of the cost, and the sickest 
10% accounts for 70% of the costs.182  In addition, the most expensive people 
in any insurance pool tend to be people with chronic conditions.183  The 
number of people with chronic conditions, and the percentage of health care 
costs devoted to the care of people with chronic conditions, is increasing over 
time.184  This increase is in large part a function of the technical improvement 
of health care.  As physicians are better able to cure infectious diseases, repair 
us when we are subject to trauma, and treat us with new drugs and devices that 
extend our lives, we are more likely to develop chronic illnesses that require 
ongoing, sometimes expensive treatment.185  Relatively current calculations 
suggest that people with chronic illnesses “account for nearly 76% of hospital 
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admissions, 80% of total hospital days, 55% of emergency room visits, 88% of 
prescriptions, 96% of home health care visits, and 72% of physician visits.”186 
Improving the quality of treatment and containing the cost of medical 
services for people with chronic illness requires the adoption of mechanisms 
for the coordination and management of their care.187  Meeting these goals also 
requires the identification and nurturing of interdisciplinary teams that 
specialize in the treatment of particular chronic illnesses.188  The concentration 
of effort and the focusing of funding on recognized centers of excellent care is 
a central component of the consumer-driven care movement.189  It has received 
increasing attention in discussions of government-focused expansions of 
insurance.190  Vermont’s 2006 broad-ranging health insurance reform measure 
is to some extent organized around the treatment of chronic illness.  It seeks to 
adopt a “chronic care model” that will be available to people with the new 
government-subsidized coverage as well as people in private health plans.191  
Both advocates of consumer-driven care and those advancing expansions of 
governmental insurance argue that increased attention on the management of 
chronic care can increase quality and reduce the overall cost of care.192 
The primary purposes of government reinsurance programs are financial; 
they are intended to reallocate risk for catastrophic costs in order to stabilize 
insurance markets, reduce the cost of coverage in small group and individual 
markets, and increase access for those low- and moderate-income workers 
most at risk of losing coverage.  These purposes are achieved by separating the 
financing of routine care from the financing of catastrophic care, which is often 
care for those with complex chronic illness. 
This financial segmentation may serve a programmatic goal as well.  The 
financial focus on complex chronic care can enhance the understanding of the 
drivers of the health insurance crisis and can further interest in solutions based 
on the adoption of emerging methods of improving care and controlling cost 
for people with chronic illness.193  The congruence of the financing system and 
the care system will help to facilitate the transformation of the health care 
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system from one based on episodic, discontinuous care for the highest cost 
patients to one in which care is coordinated and provided in settings able to 
combine efficiency with state-of-the-art excellence. 
CONCLUSION 
The crisis in American health care has spurred renewed creativity in 
reform discussions.  Unfortunately, substantial principled differences impede 
any movement toward comprehensive reform, and the best that can be 
expected in the near-term is incremental reform that does more good than 
harm.  Recent work by a number of scholars has increased interest in 
reinsurance as an important component of incremental health reform.  
Reinsurance can shore up, at least temporarily, individual and small group 
insurance markets by reducing the cost of coverage and facilitating the entry of 
the currently uninsured into these forms of coverage.  Reinsurance, in addition, 
can perform these services while fitting comfortably with a wide range of other 
incremental reform efforts motivated by diverse views of the proper shape of 
long-term reform. 
In addition, the use of government-funded reinsurance provides political 
breathing room, allowing some motion toward increased access and improved 
quality without running afoul of central tenets of divergent political positions 
on long-term insurance reform.  It serves the goals of cost control and quality 
improvement without interfering with existing health care or primary insurance 
relationships; it is flexible programmatically and financially, and it focuses 
attention on the chronically ill–the population whose care must be a focus of 
any meaningful long-term reform.  Government-funded reinsurance, then, 
serves as a valuable component to current incremental reform efforts, and also 
acts as a bridge between our current fractured discussion of health reform to a 
future comprehensive, but as-yet undetermined, comprehensive reform. 
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